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ABSTRACT
Moses & Nachum ([7]) identify conceptual flaws in Bacharach’s
generalization ([3]) of Aumann’s seminal “agreeing to dis-
agree” result ([1]). Essentially, Bacharach’s framework re-
quires agents’ decision functions to be defined over events
that are informationally meaningless for the agents. In this
paper, we argue that the analysis of the agreement theorem
should be carried out in information structures that can
accommodate for counterfactual states. We therefore de-
velop a method for constructing such “counterfactual struc-
tures” (starting from partitional structures), and prove a
new agreement theorem within such structures. Further-
more, we show that our approach also resolves the concep-
tual flaws in the sense that, within our framework, decision
functions are always only defined over events that are infor-
mationally meaningful for the agents.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.4 [Social and behavioral sciences]: Economics; I.2.4
[Knowledge Representation Formalisms and Meth-
ods]: Frames and scripts
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
Agreeing to disagree, knowledge, belief, counterfactuals
1. INTRODUCTION
In [3], Bacharach generalized Aumann’s seminal “agree-
ing to disagree” result ([1]) to the non-probabilistic case.
Essentially, he isolated the relevant properties that hold of
conditional probabilities, and of the common prior assump-
tion - which drive the original result - and imposed them
as independent conditions on general decision functions in
partitional information structures. As such, he was able to
isolate and interpret the underlying assumptions of the orig-
inal result as (i) an assumption of “like-mindedness”, which
requires agents to take the same action given the same infor-
mation, and (ii) an assumption that he claimed is analogous
to requiring the agents’ decision functions to satisfy Savage’s
Sure-Thing Principle ([9]). This principle is intended to cap-
ture the intuition that “if an agent takes the same action in
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every case when she is more informed, she takes the same
action in the case when she is more ignorant”.
However, in [7], Moses & Nachum found conceptual flaws
in Bacharach’s analysis, showing that his interpretations of
“like-mindedness” and of the Sure-Thing Principle are prob-
lematic. Indeed, given that Bacharach is operating within
partitional information structures, the information of agents
is modeled as partitions of the state space. Furthermore, de-
cision functions are defined over sets of states in a manner
that is supposed to be consistent with the information that
each agent has - in this way, decisions can be interpreted
as being functions of agents’ information. In Bacharach’s
set-up, like-mindedness requires the decision function of an
agent i to be defined over elements of the partitions of other
agents j. But, except for the trivial case in which agent
i’s partition element corresponds exactly to that of agent j,
there is no sense in requiring i’s function to be defined over
j’s partition element since that element is informationally
meaningless to agent i. The Sure-Thing Principle is also
problematic. An agent’s decision function is said to satisfy
the Sure-Thing Principle if whenever the decision over each
element of a set of disjoint events is x, the decision over
the union of all those events is also x. Notably, this implies
that an agent’s decision function must be defined over the
union of her partition elements, but again, this is informa-
tionally meaningless for that agent since there is no partition
element of that agent that corresponds to a union of her par-
tition elements. More generally, Moses & Nachum show that
Bacharach’s set-up is such that the domains of the agents’
decision functions contain elements that are informationally
meaningless for the agents.
The basic premise of this paper is that the Sure-Thing
Principle ought to be understood as an inherently counter-
factual notion, and so any analysis that involves this princi-
ple but is carried out in an information structure that does
not explicitly model the counterfactuals must be lacking in
some way. Indeed, one could reformulate the intuition that
the Sure-Thing Principle is intended to capture as: “If the
agent takes the same action in every case when she is more
informed, she would take the same action if she were more
ignorant”.
This distinction is important, but cannot be captured
within Bacharach’s framework because his analysis in [3] is
carried out in partitional structures, and all information in
those structures must be factual (in the sense that any belief
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that an agent holds must be true). In this paper, we there-
fore develop a method of transforming any given partitional
structure into an information structure that explicitly in-
cludes the relevant counterfactual states. We interpret these
“counterfactual structures” as being more complete pictures
of the situation that is being modeled in the original parti-
tional structure. The new set-up allows us to provide new
formal definitions of the Sure-Thing Principle and of like-
mindedness, that sit well with intuition, and we prove a new
agreement theorem within these counterfactual structures.
Ultimately we show that our set-up resolves the concep-
tual issues raised by [7], in the sense that within counter-
factual structures, decision functions are always only de-
fined over events that are informationally meaningful for the
agents.
In section 2 we present the formal definitions required
to analyze information structures, and in section 3 we set
up the framework of Bacharach, prove his version of the
agreement theorem and provide Moses & Nachum’s argu-
ment regarding the conceptual flaws. In section 4 we de-
velop a method for constructing counterfactual structures,
provide new definitions for the Sure-Thing Principle and for
like-mindedness, and prove a new agreement theorem within
such structures. Furthermore, we show that our approach
resolves the conceptual flaws. Finally, in section 5 we re-
late our approach to other results and proposed solutions
to the conceptual flaws found in the “agreeing to disagree”
literature, and section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the
appendix.
2. INFORMATION STRUCTURES
This section introduces the formal apparatus that will be
used to derive the agreement theorem. In large part, the
formal definitions given are completely standard.
2.1 General information structures
Let Ω denote a finite set of states and N a finite set of
agents. A subset e ⊆ Ω is called an event. For every agent
i ∈ N , define a binary relation Ri ⊆ Ω × Ω, called a reach-
ability relation. So, we say that the state ω ∈ Ω reaches
the state ω′ ∈ Ω if ωRiω′. It terms of interpretation, if
ωRiω
′, then at ω, agent i considers the state ω′ possible.
An information structure S = (Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ) is entirely
determined by the state space, the set of agents, and the
reachability relations.
The reachability relations {Ri}i∈N are said to be:
1. Serial if ∀i ∈ N, ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∃ω′ ∈ Ω, ωRiω′.
2. Reflexive if ∀i ∈ N, ∀ω ∈ Ω, ωRiω.
3. Transitive if ∀i ∈ N, ∀ω, ω′, ω′′′ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω′ &ω′Riω′′,
then ωRiω
′′.
4. Euclidean if ∀i ∈ N, ∀ω, ω′, ω′′′ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω′ &ωRiω′′,
then ω′Riω′′.
We have not yet imposed any particular restrictions on
the reachability relations. We will therefore provide the def-
initions below in a general setting, with the understanding
that they will only be applied in (i) S5, (ii)KD45 and (iii) a
special class of KD4 structures. Respectively, this is when
the reachability relations are (i) equivalence relations (re-
flexive and Euclidean), (ii) serial, transitive and Euclidean,
and (iii) serial and transitive.
A possibility set at state ω for agent i ∈ N is defined by
bi(ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω|ωRiω′} (1)
A possibility set bi(ω) is therefore, simply the set of all states
that i considers possible at ω. In terms of notation, let us
have Bi = {bi(ω)|ω ∈ Ω}. For any e ⊆ Ω, a belief operator
is given by
Bi(e) = {ω ∈ Ω|bi(ω) ⊆ e} (2)
Also, for any e ⊆ Ω, and any G ⊆ N , amutual belief operator
is given by
MG(e) = ∩i∈GBi(e) (3)
This operator can be iterated by lettingM1G(e) = MG(e) and
Mm+1G (e) = MG(M
m
G (e)) for m ≥ 1. For any e ⊆ Ω, and
any G ⊆ N , we can thus define a common belief operator,
CG(e) = ∩∞m=1MG(e) (4)
Finally, we say that a state ω′ ∈ Ω is reachable among
the agents in G from a state ω ∈ Ω if there exists ω ≡
ω0, ω1, ω2, ..., ωn ≡ ω′ such that for each k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n −
1}, there exists an agent i ∈ G such that ωkRiωk+1. The
component TG(ω) (among the agents in G) of the state ω is
the set of all states that are reachable among the agents in
G from ω. Common belief can now be given an alternative
characterization,
CG(e) = {ω ∈ Ω|TG(ω) ⊆ e} (5)
This is standard, and for example follows [6, p. 12].
2.2 Partitional structures
Consider an information structure S = (Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N )
and suppose that the reachability relations {Ri}i∈N are equiv-
alence relations. Then, we say that S is a partitional struc-
ture. Indeed, the remark below shows that in this case, the
information structure S becomes a standard partitional, or
S5, or “knowledge” structure (see for example, [1]).
Remark 1. Suppose S = (Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ) is a partitional
structure. For any agent i ∈ N , ω ∈ bi(ω), and any bi(ω)
and bi(ω
′) are either identical or disjoint; and, Bi is a par-
tition of the state space.
Note that in a partitional structure, at any state ω, an agent
i considers any of the states in bi(ω) (including ω itself)
possible. The belief operator becomes the standard “knowl-
edge” operator, and satisfies the following properties, which
are well-known in the literature:
K Bi(¬e ∪ f) ∩Bi(e) ⊆ Bi(f) Kripke
D Bi(e) ⊆ ¬Bi(¬e) Consistency
T Bi(e) ⊆ e Truth
4 Bi(e) ⊆ Bi(Bi(e)) Positive Introspection
5 ¬Bi(e) ⊆ Bi(¬Bi(e)) Negative Introspection
Note that in a partitional structure, the operator CG has
the familiar interpretation of being the“common knowledge”
operator. Furthermore, since this reduces to a completely
standard framework, we easily obtain familiar results, such
as the proposition below.
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Proposition 1. Suppose S = (Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ) is a par-
titional structure. Then, for any ω ∈ Ω and any i ∈ G,
∪ω′∈TG(ω)bi(ω′) = TG(ω).
2.3 Belief structures
Suppose now that the reachability relations {Ri}i∈N in
an information structure S = (Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ) are serial,
transitive and Euclidean. Then, say we that S is a belief
structure. Indeed, the information structure S becomes a
standard KD45 structure, for example, as presented in [6].
Remark 2. Suppose S = (Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ) is a belief struc-
ture. For any agent i ∈ N , and any ω ∈ Ω, bi(ω) 
= ∅, and
if ω ∈ bi(ω′), then bi(ω) = bi(ω′).
It is important to note that although every possibility set
must be non-empty, it can be the case that ω 
∈ bi(ω). This
means that at state ω, agent i considers states other than ω
to be possible, and not ω itself. The agent is therefore “de-
luded”. (In fact, this terminology is directly borrowed from
[6, p. 5]). Unsurprisingly, the belief operator now no longer
satisfies the truth property T, but it does satisfy K, D, 4,
and 5.
The salient point here is that the set-up presented has
very close analogues in the literature, and allows us to drop
- among other things - the property T of the belief operator,
as compared with partitional structures. This will be impor-
tant when including counterfactual states since by their very
nature, these will be used to model information that can be
false.
3. AGREEING ON DECISIONS
In this section, we present the original set-up of [3], derive
his version of the agreement theorem, and then outline its
inherent conceptual flaws which were originally raised in [7].
3.1 The original result
The original result was derived in a partitional informa-
tion structure. The set-up in this entire section therefore
assumes that we are working with a partitional structure
S = (Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ). Notably, this means that Bi is taken
to be a partition of the state space for every agent i ∈ N
(see Remark 1).
For every agent i ∈ N , an action function δi : Ω → A,
which maps from states to actions, specifies agent i’s action
at any given state as a function of i’s possibility set at that
state (which is intended to represent i’s“information”at that
state); so the value of the action function will fully depend
on the partition Bi. A decision function Di for agent i, maps
from a field F of subsets of Ω into a set A of actions. That
is,
Di : F → A (6)
Following the terminology of [7], we will say that the agent
i using the action function δi follows the decision function
Di if for all states ω ∈ Ω, δi(ω) = Di(bi(ω)).
Bacharach imposes two main restrictions in order to de-
rive his result, namely, the Sure-Thing Principle and like-
mindedness. The definitions of these terms are given below.
Definition 1. The decision function Di of agent i satisfies
the Sure-Thing Principle if whenever for all e ∈ E , Di(e) = x
then Di(∪e∈Ee) = x, where E ⊆ F is a non-empty set of
disjoint events.
In terms of interpretation, we can think of an event as rep-
resenting some information and a decision over that event as
determining the action that is taken as a function of that in-
formation. The union of events is intended to capture some
form of “coarsening” of the information. So, following [7],
the Sure-Thing Principle is intended to capture the intuition
that “If the agent takes the same action in every case when
she is more informed, she takes the same action in the case
when she is more ignorant”. Regarding like-mindedness, we
have the following definition.
Definition 2. Agents are said to be like-minded if they
have the same decision function.
That is, over the same subsets of states, the agents take
the same action if they are like-minded. This is intended to
capture the intuition that given the same information, the
agents would take the same action.
Theorem 1. Let S = (Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ) be a partitional
structure. Then within S, if the agents i ∈ N are like-
minded (as defined in Definition 2) and follow the decision
functions {Di}i∈N (as defined in (6)) that satisfy the Sure-
Thing Principle (as defined in Definition 1), then for any
G ⊆ N , if CG(∩i∈G{ω′ ∈ Ω|δi(ω′) = xi}) 
= ∅ then xi = xj
for all i, j ∈ G.
This theorem states that if the actions taken by each mem-
ber of a group of like-minded agents, who follow decision
functions that satisfy the Sure-Thing Principle, are com-
mon knowledge among that group, then the members of the
group must all take the same action. That is, the agents
cannot “agree to disagree” about what action to take.
3.2 Conceptual flaws
[7] find conceptual flaws in the set-up of [3] outlined above.
In broad terms, they find that the requirements that Bacharach
imposes on the decision functions forces them to be defined
over sets of states, the interpretation of which is meaning-
less within the information structure he is operating in. For-
mally, consider the following definition.
Definition 3. Let S = (Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ) be some arbitrary
information structure. We say that an event e is a possible
belief for agent i in S if there exists a state ω ∈ Ω such that
e = bi(ω).
When S is a partitional structure, this definition corresponds
exactly to e being a “possible state of knowledge” as defined
in [7]. In [7], it is shown that
1. The Sure-Thing Principle forces decisions to be defined
over unions of possibility sets, but no union of possi-
bility sets can be a possible belief for any agent (see
[7, Lemma 3.2]).
2. The assumption of like-mindedness forces the decision
function of an agent i to be defined over the possibility
sets of agents j 
= i, but - other than the case when
they correspond trivially - these are not possible beliefs
for agent i (see [7, Lemma 3.3]).
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In other words, Bacharach’s framework requires the decision
functions to be defined over events that are not possible
beliefs for the agents (within the information structure).
4. COUNTERFACTUAL STRUCTURES
The basic premise of this paper is that the Sure-Thing
Principle ought to be understood as an inherently counter-
factual notion, and so any analysis that involves this princi-
ple but is carried out in an information structure that does
not explicitly model the counterfactuals must be lacking
in some way. Indeed, one could reformulate the intuition
that the Sure-Thing Principle is intended to capture as: “If
the agent takes the same action in every case when she is
more informed, she would take the same action if she were
more ignorant” (where “more ignorant” has a well-defined
meaning). This is counterfactual in the sense that there
is no requirement for the agent to actually be more igno-
rant. Rather, the requirement is that the agent would take
the same action in the situation where she imagines herself,
counterfactually, to be more ignorant.
This distinction is important, but cannot be captured
within Bacharach’s framework. Indeed, the analysis in [3]
is carried out in partitional structures. However, since the
truth property T holds in such structures, every conceivable
belief must be factual, and so by definition, counterfactual
situations cannot be considered.1 In this section, we there-
fore develop a method of transforming any given partitional
structure into an information structure that explicitly in-
cludes the relevant counterfactual states. We interpret such
“counterfactual structures” as being more complete pictures
of the situation being modeled in the original partitional
structure. We then provide new formal definitions for the
Sure-Thing Principle and for like-mindedness and derive a
new agreement theorem within these new structures. Ulti-
mately this will resolve the conceptual issues raised by [7],
in the sense that within counterfactual structures, decision
functions are defined only over events that are possible be-
liefs for the agents.
4.1 Set-up with counterfactual states
In this section we define a method of transforming any
given partitional structure into an information structure that
explicitly includes the relevant counterfactual states.
It will be useful to introduce some new definitions. Sup-
pose S = (Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ) is a partitional structure. For
every agent i ∈ N , define Ii(ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω|ωRiω′}. Triv-
ially, Ii(ω) is the equivalence class of the state ω, and for
each i ∈ N , Ii = {Ii(ω)|ω ∈ Ω} is a partition of the state
space (by Remark 1). Finally, let us define,
Γi = {∪e∈Ee|E ⊆ Ii, E 
= ∅} (7)
Clearly, Γi consists of all the partition elements of i, and of
all the possible unions across those partitions elements.
Construction of counterfactuals. Let S = (Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N )
be a partitional structure. We can immediately define Ii(ω) =
{ω′ ∈ Ω|ωRiω′}, the partition Ii = {Ii(ω)|ω ∈ Ω}, and the
set Γi (described above) for every i ∈ N . From S, we can
create a new structure S ′ = (Ω′, N, {R′i}i∈N ), which we call
1An agent i’s belief in an event E if factual if Bi(E) ⊆ E.
the counterfactual structure of S, where Ω′ = Ω ∪ Λ, Λ is a
set of states distinct from Ω, and R′i ⊆ Ω′×Ω is a reachabil-
ity relation for every i ∈ N . The construction of the set Λ
and of the reachability relations {R′i}i∈N is described below.
• For every i ∈ N , and for every e ∈ Γi, create a set Λei of
new states, which contains exactly one duplicate λei,ω
of the state ω for every ω ∈ Ω (so |Λei | = |Ω|). We say
that the counterfactual state λei,ω is the counterfactual
of ω for agent i with respect to the event e. The set of
states Λ is simply the set of all counterfactual states.
Namely, Λ = ∪i∈N ∪e∈Γi Λei .2
• We now describe the process to construct the reacha-
bility relations {R′i}i∈N . For every agent i ∈ N , start
with R′i = Ri. We will add new elements to R
′
i ac-
cording to the following method: For every λ ∈ Λ, if
λ = λei,ω for some ω ∈ Ω and e ∈ Γi, then (i) if ω ∈ e
(that is, if λei,ω is the duplicate of a state in e), then for
every ω′ ∈ e, add (λei,ω, ω′) as an element to R′i, and
(ii) if ω 
∈ e, then for every ω′ ∈ Ii(ω), add (λei,ω, ω′) as
an element to R′i. Finally, if λ = λ
e
j,ω for some ω ∈ Ω,
and e ∈ Γj where j ∈ N\{i}, then for every ω′ ∈ Ii(ω),
add (λej,ω, ω
′) as an element to R′i. Nothing else is an
element of R′i.
This is best explained by means of an example. Con-
sider a partitional structure S with Ω = {ω0, ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4},
N = {a, b}, and partitions Ia and Ib as represented in Figure
1. In Figures 2-4, we represent a selection of substructures of
the counterfactual structure S ′ of S.3 Figure 2 shows the set
of counterfactual states Λ
{ω3,ω4}
a , as well as Ω, and the reach-
ability relations, R′i ⊆ Λ{ω3,ω4}a × Ω, of both agents across
these two sets. The reachability relations R′i ⊆ Ω × Ω are
left out, but they are unchanged (relative to S) and therefore
identical to what is shown in Figure 1. Note that each state
in Λ
{ω3,ω4}
a is simply a duplicate of a corresponding state
in Ω. For agent b, every state λ
{ω3,ω4}
a,ω simply points to all
the states ω′ ∈ Ib(ω) (and nothing else). For agent a, every
state λ
{ω3,ω4}
a,ω such that ω ∈ {ω0, ω1, ω2} simply points to
all the states ω′ ∈ Ia(ω) (and nothing else). However, for a
state ω ∈ {ω3, ω4}, every state λ{ω3,ω4}a,ω points to both ω3
and ω4 (and nothing else), even though Ii(ω3)∩ Ii(ω4) = ∅.
A similar patterns holds in Figures 3 and 4 which are there
as additional examples for the reader. For practical reasons,
we do not represent the full sets Λ and R′i ⊆ Ω′ × Ω in a
single diagram; and, note that even when taken together
Figures 1-4 do not offer a complete picture of S ′.
The counterfactual structure of a partitional structure has
several interesting properties, which we derive below.
Proposition 2. Suppose that S ′ = (Ω′, N, {R′i}i∈N ) is
the counterfactual structure of a partitional structure S =
2Note that the indexing of the sets Λei by both e and i is
crucial. Indeed, one must note that for any i ∈ N , and for
any e, e′ ∈ Γi such that e 
= e′, Λei ∩ Λe
′
i = ∅. Furthermore,
for any i, j ∈ N such that i 
= j, if e ∈ Γi and e′ ∈ Γj ,
Λei ∩ Λe
′
j = ∅ (even if e = e′).
3Consider any two information structures S+ =
(Ω+, N, {R+i }i∈N ) and S− = (Ω−, N, {R−i }i∈N ). We
say that S− is a substructure of S+ if Ω− ⊆ Ω+ and
R−i ⊆ R+i for every i ∈ N .
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ω0
ω1
ω2
ω3
ω4
a
b
b
a
a
b
a
Figure 1: Ω and the partitions Ia and Ib
λa,ω0
{ω3,ω4 }
λa,ω1
{ω3,ω4 }
λa,ω2
{ω3,ω4 }
λa,ω3
{ω3,ω4 }
λa,ω4
{ω3,ω4 }
ω0
ω1
ω2
ω3
ω4
a b
b
b
ba
a
a
a b
a b
a b
ab
ab
Figure 2: Λ
{ω3,ω4}
a ∪Ω and R′i ⊆ Λ{ω3,ω4}a ×Ω for i ∈ {a, b}
(Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ). Then the reachability relations {R′i}i∈N
are serial and transitive.
Proposition 3. Suppose that S ′ = (Ω′, N, {R′i}i∈N ) is
the counterfactual structure of a partitional structure S =
(Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ). Then for any agent i ∈ N , (i) for any
ω ∈ Ω′, bi(ω) 
= ∅, and if ω ∈ bi(ω′), bi(ω) ⊆ bi(ω′), and (ii)
for any ω ∈ Ω, bi(ω) = Ii(ω).
From the above, we have that counterfactual structures
of partitional structures belong to the class of KD4 struc-
tures. In particular, the belief operator now only satisfies
propertiesK,D, and 4; so“negative introspection”no longer
holds, relative to belief structures. (See section 5.2 for fur-
ther discussion of this point). Note however that within
the counterfactual structure S ′ = (Ω′, N, {R′i}i∈N ) of a par-
titional structure S = (Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ), the substructure
(Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ) of S ′ corresponds exactly to the original
structure S and is therefore partitional. A further result
will be useful.
Proposition 4. Suppose that S ′ = (Ω′, N, {R′i}i∈N ) is
the counterfactual structure of a partitional structure S =
(Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ). Then for any ω ∈ Ω′ and any G ⊆ N ,
(i) if ω′ ∈ TG(ω), then ω′ ∈ Ω, and (ii) for any i ∈ G,
∪ω′∈TG(ω)bi(ω′) = TG(ω).
4.2 The agreement theorem
We will now adapt the main definitions required to derive
the agreement theorem within the counterfactual structure
of a partitional structure.
Throughout this section, we consider a partitional struc-
ture S = (Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ), and the counterfactual struc-
ture S ′ = (Ω′, N, {R′i}i∈N ) of S. As before, we can define
λb,ω0
{ω3,ω4 }
λb,ω1
{ω3,ω4 }
λb,ω2
{ω3,ω4 }
λb,ω3
{ω3,ω4 }
λb,ω4
{ω3,ω4 }
ω0
ω1
ω2
ω3
ω4
a b
b
b
ba
a
a
a b
a b
a b
b
b
Figure 3: Λ
{ω3,ω4}
b ∪Ω and R′i ⊆ Λ{ω3,ω4}b ×Ω for i ∈ {a, b}
λb,ω0
{ω0 ,ω1,ω2 }
λb,ω1
{ω0 ,ω1,ω2 }
λb,ω2
{ω0 ,ω1,ω2 }
λb,ω3
{ω0 ,ω1,ω2 }
λb,ω4
{ω0 ,ω1,ω2 }
ω0
ω1
ω2
ω3
ω4
a b
ba
a b
a b
a b
b
b
a
b b
b
b
ba
b
Figure 4: Λ
{ω0,ω1,ω2}
b ∪ Ω and R′i ⊆ Λ{ω0,ω1,ω2}b × Ω for
i ∈ {a, b}
Ii(ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω|ωRiω′}, the partition Ii = {Ii(ω)|ω ∈ Ω},
and the set Γi for every i ∈ N .
A decision function Di for an agent i ∈ N maps from Γi
to a set of actions. That is,
Di : Γi → A (8)
We now say that an action function δi : Ω
′ → A follows de-
cision function Di if for all states ω ∈ Ω′, δi(ω) = Di(bi(ω)).
The following proposition guarantees that this is well-defined.
Proposition 5. Suppose that S ′ = (Ω′, N, {R′i}i∈N ) is
the counterfactual structure of a partitional structure S =
(Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ). Then for any ω ∈ Ω′, bi(ω) ∈ Γi.
Below, we provide definitions for the Sure-Thing Principle
and like-mindedness that are analogous to the ones proposed
by Bacharach. We elaborate on their interpretations in sec-
tion 4.4.
Definition 4. The decision function Di of agent i satisfies
the Sure-Thing Principle if for any non-empty subset E of
Ii, whenever for all e ∈ E , Di(e) = x then Di(∪e∈Ee) = x.
The domain Γi includes all possible unions of elements of
the partition Ii, so this is well-defined. Furthermore, note
that E must be a set of disjoint events.4
Definition 5. Agents i and j are said to be like-minded
if for any e ∈ Γi and any e′ ∈ Γj , if e = e′ then Di(e) =
4This contrasts with [7] who, in their solution, propose
adopting a version of the Sure-Thing Principle that does
not require the disjointness of events.
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Dj(e
′).5
Theorem 2. Let S ′ = (Ω′, N, {R′i}i∈N ) be the counter-
factual structure of a partitional structure S = (Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ).
Then, within S ′, if the agents i ∈ N are like-minded (as
defined in Definition 5) and follow the decision functions
{Di}i∈N (as defined in (8)) that satisfy the Sure-Thing Prin-
ciple (as defined in Definition 4), then for any G ⊆ N , if
CG(∩i∈G{ω′ ∈ Ω′|δi(ω′) = xi}) 
= ∅ then xi = xj for all
i, j ∈ G.
Although this agreement theorem might appear to have
many similarities with the previous one, it is conceptually
entirely distinct. In particular, we show below (in section
4.3) that we were able to obtain the result while avoiding the
conceptual flaws that were discussed in section 3.2. We also
provide an interpretation of Theorem 2 and of counterfactual
structures of partitional structures more generally in section
4.4.
4.3 Solution to the conceptual flaws
As discussed in section 3.2, Bacharach’s framework re-
quires the decision functions to be defined over events that
are not possible beliefs for the agents. The proposition below
shows that this is not the case in our set-up.
Proposition 6. Suppose that S ′ = (Ω′, N, {R′i}i∈N ) is
the counterfactual structure of a partitional structure S =
(Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ). Then for any e ∈ Γi, there exists an ω ∈ Ω′
such that bi(ω) = e. (In fact, there exists a state λ
e
i,ω ∈ Λ
for some ω ∈ e such that bi(λei,ω) = e).
This proposition, in conjunction with Proposition 5, shows
that in our set-up, the domain of the decision function of
every agent is exactly the set of all possible beliefs for that
agent. Indeed, our decision functions are defined over unions
of partition elements, but these are possible beliefs for the
agents because for every such union, there exists a coun-
terfactual state at which the possibility set is precisely that
union. We therefore avoid the first point in the conceptual
flaws raised by [7]. Regarding the second point, the deci-
sion function Di of agent i is now only defined over events
in Γi. There is therefore no requirement for the function
to determine the agent’s action in the case where the event
corresponds to a partition element of another agent.
4.4 Interpretation
In this section, we provide an interpretation of our as-
sumptions, showing that the formal definitions of the Sure-
Thing Principle and of like-mindedness given in our set-up
match well with intuition. We also provide an interpretation
of the agreement theorem in counterfactual structures, and
of those structures more generally.
Our notion of like-mindedness is straightforward: Over
the same information, like-minded agents take the same ac-
tion. However, our definition has an advantage over Bacharach’s
which is that an agent i is not required to consider what ac-
tion to take over the partition elements of another agent j.
5In contrast with the previous definition, we do not say that
agents are like-minded if they have the“same”decision func-
tions since the domains of the decision functions will now
typically be different for different agents.
With regards to the Sure-Thing Principle, the proposi-
tion below, in particular part (ii), allows us to interpret our
version of the principle as capturing the intuition that: “If
the agent takes the same action in every case when she is
more informed, she would take the same action if she were
(secretly) more ignorant”.
Proposition 7. Suppose that S ′ = (Ω′, N, {R′i}i∈N ) is
the counterfactual structure of a partitional structure S =
(Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ). Then, (i) for any e ⊆ Ω′, and ω, ω′ ∈ Ω′,
bi(ω) ⊆ e and bi(ω′) ⊆ e if and only if bi(λbi(ω)∪bi(ω
′)
i,ω′′ ) ⊆ e
(for some ω′′ ∈ Ω). (ii) For any e ⊆ Ω′, and ω, ω′ ∈ Ω,
bi(ω) ⊆ e and bi(ω′) ⊆ e if and only if bi(λbi(ω)∪bi(ω
′)
i,ω ) ⊆ e.
Indeed, suppose S ′ = (Ω′, N, {R′i}i∈N ) is the counterfac-
tual structure of a partitional structure S = (Ω, N, {Ri}i∈N ).
Now consider an agent i, and two partition elements Ii(ω),
Ii(ω
′) ∈ Ii (where ω, ω′ ∈ Ω), and suppose that her deci-
sion function is such that Di(Ii(ω)) = Di(Ii(ω
′)) = x. The
Sure-Thing Principle requires that Di(Ii(ω) ∪ Ii(ω′)) = x.
Propositions 6 shows that the possibility set that corre-
sponds to Ii(ω) ∪ Ii(ω′) is bi(λIi(ω)∪Ii(ω
′)
i,ω ). Proposition 7
part (ii) shows that for any event e, i believes e at the coun-
terfactual state λ
Ii(ω)∪Ii(ω′)
i,ω if and only if i also believes e
at the states within each of those partition elements. In-
formally, if we can call a belief in an event “information”,
then the information that i has at the counterfactual state
preserves only the information that is the same across both
the partition elements. In this sense, the information that
i has at the counterfactual state is the information that i
would have if she were just more ignorant than at a state in
either of the partition elements.6 Furthermore, by construc-
tion of counterfactual structures, there is no state ω′′′ ∈ Ω′
and no j ∈ N such that (ω′′′, λIi(ω)∪Ii(ω′)i,ω ) ∈ R′j ; and, for
any j 
= i, (λIi(ω)∪Ii(ω′)i,ω , ω′′′) ∈ R′j for every ω′′′ ∈ Ij(ω)
only. In words, this means that at this counterfactual state,
i may have become “more ignorant”, but the information of
all other agents is unchanged. The information at this state
therefore truly captures the fact that i is imagining herself
secretly to be more ignorant. The situation is counterfactual
since all other agents still believe that i has the information
that she does in the partition Ii.
We believe that this interpretation of the Sure-Thing Prin-
ciple matches well with intuition. In particular, given that
the principle finds its origins in single-agent decision theory
(see [9]), it makes sense that the requirement on the deci-
sions in cases where the agents are more ignorant is imposed
only when ignorance is secret - in the sense that the infor-
mation of all other agents is unchanged.
More generally, our interpretation of the counterfactual
structure S ′ of a partitional structure S is therefore that
it is simply a more complete picture of the situation that
is being modeled by the structure S since it also includes
states in which the agents imagine themselves (secretly, and
counterfactually) to be more ignorant. The inclusion of
these states turns out to be relevant in deriving appropriate
formal definitions of the Sure-Thing Principle and of like-
mindedness, and in resolving the conceptual flaws regarding
6In fact, it corresponds to being just “less informed”, in a
sense similar to that given in [8].
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the domain of the decision functions. Indeed, we can think
of the substructure S of S ′ as representing the “actual” situ-
ation, and the counterfactual states Λ are essentially “fake”
in the sense that they do not actually occur. However, they
are connected to the “actual” states in Ω in a manner that
captures every possible way in which every agent could be
secretly more ignorant relative to the “actual” situation; and
although the “fake” states do not occur, the decision func-
tions are essentially defined at such states (More precisely,
they are defined over possibility sets that are defined as such
states).7 This turns out to be crucial: Theorem 2 is derived
by showing that when the actions of agents are commonly
known, the Sure-Thing Principle and like-mindedness imply
that the actions must be the same precisely in the case when
the decision functions are based on the information at some
counterfactual (or “fake”) states. The equality at the coun-
terfactual states then carries over to the decisions over the
information in the “actual” situation, and therefore agents
cannot agree to disagree.
5. RELATION TO THE LITERATURE
We now discuss our approach in relation to other solutions
that were proposed regarding the conceptual flaws. We then
also compare our construction of the counterfactual states
to other models that carry out a related exercise.
5.1 Other solutions
[7] propose a solution to the conceptual flaws that they
found in the result of [3]. Essentially, they define a“relevance
projection”, which maps from sets of states to the “relevant
information”at that set of states (see [7, p. 158]). They then
impose conditions on this projection and on the decision
functions to derive a new agreement theorem. However, it
is not always obvious how a projection satisfying their condi-
tions ought to be found. In contrast, the approach presented
here offers a constructive method of obtaining a structure in
which the analysis can be carried out.8 Furthermore, our
Sure-Thing Principle does require the disjointness of events,
which their version does not.
[2] also propose a solution using a purely syntactic ap-
proach. The approach presented here is completely set-
theoretic. Furthermore, they impose the condition that higher-
order information must be irrelevant to the agents’ decision,
which we do not impose here.
Finally, [8] presented a very interesting solution to the
conceptual flaws by redefining the Sure-Thing Principle en-
tirely. Roughly, Samet’s “Interpersonal Sure-Thing Princi-
ple” states that if agent i knows that agent j is more in-
formed than he is, and knows that j’s action is x, then i
takes action x. Combining this with the assumption of the
existence of an “epistemic dummy” - an agent who is less
informed than every other agent - [8] proves a new agree-
ment theorem in paritional structures. The large differences
in the assumptions make a formal comparison between the
approach here and in [8] difficult.
7Notice that this shows that our counterfactual structures
are particular “impossible-world” structures (e.g. see [12]).
We return to this point in section 5.
8Also, the resulting counterfactual structure does satisfy
properties that resemble, in spirit, the conditions imposed
on the relevance projection.
5.2 Action models
Loosely speaking, it was shown that the information at
the counterfactual states in a counterfactual structure cor-
responds to secretly “losing” information. It turns out that
secretly “gaining” information is well-studied in the dynamic
epistemic logic literature (e.g. [4]). Action models formalize
how the underlying structure (both the state space and the
reachability relations) must be modified to model various
protocols by which agents may gain some new information.
It was shown, [11, Theorem 17], that in the case of secretly
gaining new information, a partitional structure would have
to be transformed into a belief structure. In this paper, we
have defined a method of modeling secret loss of information
by transforming a partitional structure into a (counterfac-
tual) structure that belongs to the KD4 class. In partic-
ular, this means that “negative introspection” is dropped
as a property of the belief operator. We have not shown
that it is necessary to drop negative introspection in order
to model secret loss of information, so in principle, it re-
mains an open question as to whether it is possible to define
a purely semantic transformation of a partitional structure
(i.e. only involving the states and the reachability relations)
that can model secret loss of information where the resulting
structure is a belief structure in which the primitives of the
original model (i.e. the original state space and partitions
over them) are unchanged.9
5.3 Counterfactuals
General set-theoretic information structures have been pro-
posed to model counterfactuals (e.g. see [5]), especially in
relation to the literature on backwards induction. In exten-
sive form games, to implement the backwards induction so-
lution, agents must consider what they would do at histories
of the game that might never be reached. They must there-
fore be able to define what they would do in situations that
never occur. This therefore bears some resemblance to our
set-up in which agents are required to have decisions that
are defined over information at counterfactual (or “fake”)
states that never actually occur, but there are important
differences which we briefly outline below.
There is a multitude of ways in which counterfactuals can
be modeled, and we cannot hope to survey the literature
here. However, it will suffice to say that a general approach
to modeling counterfactuals proceeds in roughly the follow-
ing manner: One defines a “closeness” relation on states and
then says that a state ω belongs to the event “If f were the
case, then e would be true” if e is true in all the closest
states to ω where f is true. It is possible to then augment
this approach with epistemic operators and decisions, but
the salient point is simply that the standard approach to
counterfactuals aims to be quite general, in capturing all
possible hypothetical situations f .
In contrast, we only model counterfactuals for a very par-
ticular set of hypothetical situations, namely, every possible
9[10] analyzes counterfactuals in KD45 structures. How-
ever, his initial structures are KD45, whereas the point
made here is regarding a method that would transform a
partitional structure into a KD45 structure while building
the relevant counterfactual states and leaving the primitives
of the original model unchanged.
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situation (relative to the “actual” situation) in which every
agent considers herself to be secretly more ignorant. This
is not done by imposing a closeness relation, but by creat-
ing a new set of “fake” counterfactual states and carefully
re-wiring them to the “actual” states. (Note however, that
the resulting information at the counterfactual states was
shown to be interpretable as being secretly “just” more ig-
norant than in the “actual” situation being considered, so
in this sense, the counterfactual state can be seen as being
“close” to the actual situation). As a result, it is not obvi-
ous to see how the method developed here can be applied to
studying backwards induction, which requires considering a
richer set of hypothetical situations, but the method is well-
adapted for the analysis of agreement theorems carried out
in this paper.
Note that there is another approach to modeling coun-
terfactuals that is related to ours. What is known as the
“impossible-worlds” approach (e.g. [12]) augments informa-
tion structures with a new set of states and with modified
reachability relations. The set of states in the original struc-
ture are then referred to as “possible”, or “normal”, worlds,
while the ones in the new set are referred to as “impossible”,
or “non-normal”. In our framework, these actually corre-
spond to our “actual” states Ω, and our “fake” states Λ (and
the reachability relations are modified from Ri to R
′
i for
every i). The counterfactual structures presented here can
therefore be seen as specific “impossible-worlds” structures.
However, we are not aware of any paper that use impossible-
worlds structures as a tool for modeling counterfactuals in
the manner presented here.
6. CONCLUSION
We provided a constructive method for creating an in-
formation structure that includes the relevant counterfac-
tual states (starting from a partitional structure). This new
counterfactual structure is interpreted as providing a more
complete picture of the situation that is being modeled by
the original partitional structure. As such, our analysis of
the agreement theorem is carried out in such structures.
Having provided new formal definitions for the Sure-Thing
Principle and for like-mindedness, we prove an agreement
theorem within such structures, and show that we can in-
terpret our version of the Sure-Thing principle as capturing
the intuition that: “If the agent takes the same action in
every case when she is more informed, she would take the
same action if she were (secretly) more ignorant”. We also
show that our version of like-mindedness has more desirable
properties than Bacharach’s. Furthermore, we show that
our approach resolves the conceptual issues raised by [7],
in the sense that within counterfactual structures, decision
functions are defined only over events that are possible be-
liefs for the agents.
Therefore, in providing a constructive method for creating
counterfactual structures, our approach achieves the goal of
maintaining an interpretation of the underlying assumptions
of the agreement theorem that fits well with intuition, while
simultaneously resolving the conceptual issues (identified in
[7]) regarding the domain of the decision functions.
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